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Abstract 
 
Two competing hypotheses, value enhancing and value discounting, state that implementing 
socially responsible corporate policies can have positive or negative effects on firm value. 
This paper tests how a specific type of social responsibility–corporate equality–affects firm 
value. Corporate equality is measured by the corporate equality index (CEI). This index 
quantifies how companies treat their gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender employees, 
consumers, and investors. Using a sample of CEI-rated, publicly traded firms in the U.S., we 
find that, between 2002 and 2006, firms with a higher degree of corporate equality have 
higher stock returns and higher market valuation (Q). We provide suggestive, causal 
evidence that corporate equality enhances firm value through better performance in product 
markets and labor markets: Firms with a higher degree of corporate equality also tend to 
have larger sales, higher profit margins, higher employee productivity, and attract more 
employees. These results are robust to the inclusion of unobserved firm-heterogeneities. 
Overall, our results support the value-enhancing effects of corporate social responsibility. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The growing literature on corporate social responsibility has provided mixed results on how 
social responsibility affects firm value.  This paper contributes to the social responsibility 
literature by testing how and through what channels firm value is affected by a specific type 
of social responsibility–corporate equality. Corporate equality is measured by the corporate 
equality index (CEI). This index quantifies how companies treat their gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgender (GLBT) employees, consumers, and investors.   
 
In the literature, a socially responsible company is defined based on a broad set of different 
criteria, including ethical, social, and environmental criteria. For example, a company is 
considered socially irresponsible if it is involved in producing alcohol, tobacco, and 
gambling, or has operations in South Africa, or is engaged in military weapons or nuclear 
power. In contrast, a company is considered socially responsible if it contributes to pollution 
reduction, has good employee relations or good corporate governance, or has significant 
participation in the community. 1
 
As more and more firms have implemented socially responsible policies, a natural question 
arises: Does social responsibility affect firm value? Most of the existing evidence comes 
from studies testing the excess returns of socially responsible investments (SRI). Compared 
to conventional portfolios, SRI portfolios can have better or poorer performance, which we 
call the value-enhancing hypothesis and value-discounting hypothesis, respectively. 
Proponents of the value-discounting hypothesis argue that SRI portfolios cannot outperform 
conventional portfolios because using a set of SRI criteria to screen securities imposes a 
constraint on the choice set of risk-return optimization, resulting in reduced diversification. 
In addition, investors who care about social responsibility may derive non-financial utility 
from SRI by holding assets consistent with SRI screening criteria, or are willing to pay a 
price to avoid holding unethical assets; therefore, they would accept a lower rate of return.  
 
Many studies have provided supportive evidence for the value-discounting hypothesis. 
Hamilton, Jo, and Statman (1993), Mallin, Saadouni, and Briston  (1995), Sauer (1997), 
Goldreyer and Diltz (1999), Statman (2000), Bello (2005), and Bauer, Koedijk, and Otten 
(2005) all find that the performance of socially responsible mutual funds is not statistically 
different from the performance of conventional mutual funds. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) 
find that sin stocks (publicly traded companies involved in producing alcohol, tobacco, and 
gambling) outperform other comparable stocks. They argue that sin stocks are underpriced 
because they are neglected by an important set of investors, and that greater litigation risk is 
associated with sin stock companies, further increasing the expected returns of sin stocks. 
Since SRI is the opposite of sin stocks, SRI should have lower returns than comparables. 
Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005) find that SRI constraints impose substantial costs on 
investors. More compelling results are found in Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2008). They 
use an international data set and find that the average socially responsible funds in the U.S., 
the U.K., and many European and Asian countries underperform their domestic conventional 
                                                 
1  Renneboog, Horst, and Zhang (2008) summarize 21types of social responsibility screening criteria. Statman 
(2006) reviews four types of socially responsible indexes. 
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funds by –2.2% to –6.5% per year, and the results are robust even after controlling for 
screening activities and major fund characteristics such as size, age, and management fees. 
 
In contrast, the value-enhancing hypothesis states that SRI portfolios can outperform 
conventional counterparts due to the following reasons. First, socially responsible corporate 
policies increase firm value by better protecting shareholders. For example, Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick (2003) construct a corporate governance index to measure the degree of 
shareholder protection, and they find that firms with stronger shareholder rights have higher 
abnormal returns. Second, if socially responsible corporate policies are considered of value 
to consumers and employees, sales will increase and employee relations will improve, which 
can translate into a higher firm value. Heal (2005) provides a few examples and 
demonstrates that consumers value social responsibility and are motivated to buy socially 
responsible products and services. This “brand equity” effect will increase sales of socially 
responsible companies.  He also argues that companies with good employee relations can 
attract and retain good employees. Employee loyalty helps improve productivity and 
innovation, thus enhancing profitability. Finally, socially responsible criteria adopted by a 
company may result in cost savings, implicit or explicit, thus increasing the firm’s value. For 
example, Heal (2005) argues that implementing socially responsible corporate policies can 
reduce potential conflicts between companies and society, which generates net cost savings.  
 
A few recent empirical studies support the value-enhancing hypothesis. Statman (2007) finds 
that a socially responsible portfolio can have better performance. Kempf and Osthoff (2007) 
use the KLD Research & Analytics, Inc. rating data to form a portfolio of stocks with high 
SRI ratings and another with low SRI ratings. 2  A long-short trading strategy (long in the 
high-rated stocks and short in the low-rated stocks) can generate abnormal returns, up to 
8.7% per year. Both studies conclude that companies doing “good” can also do well, 
suggesting that capital markets do value social responsibilities.3
 
In this paper, we focus on a specific type of social responsibility–corporate equality, 
measured by the corporate equality index (CEI). This index quantifies how large U.S. 
businesses treat their GLBT employees, consumers, and investors. Although corporate 
equality can be measured by other indexes, such as policies preventing employment 
discrimination against women, minority, or disabled people, such policies are legalized 
nationally. However, non-discrimination policies based on sexual orientation vary 
tremendously across states, cities, and firms. Such variation across firms is ideal for the 
purpose of this study.  
 
Like people valuing democracy, peace, environment quality, and such, people also value 
corporate equality, from different perspectives. As a specific type of social responsibility, 
does corporate equality have any real impact on firm value? So far, there has been no 
empirical study identifying the effect of corporate equality, although value-discounting and 
                                                 
2 The KLD rating is based on a set of comprehensive indicators, including environmental, social, and corporate 
governance, among which the policies towards gays and lesbians are considered. For details of the KLD ratings 
indicators, please visit www.kld.com/research/stats/indicators.html. 
3 In a meta-analysis of 167 studies on the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance from 1972 to 2007, Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh (2007) conclude that, overall, such a 
relationship is mildly positive. 
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value-enhancing hypotheses make opposite predictions of its effect on firm value. We use 
the CEI scores published by the Human Rights Campaign Foundation (HRC) from 2002 to 
2006, to examine how corporate equality affects firm value. Consistent with the value-
enhancing explanation, our results indicate that firms with a higher level of corporate 
equality have higher stock returns and higher market valuation (Q). We also find supportive, 
causal evidence that corporate equality affects firm value through two channels–product 
markets and labor markets: Firms with higher CEI scores have more sales, higher profit 
margins, higher productivity in terms of total revenue per employee, and attract more 
employees. Our results suggest that corporate equality is appreciated by both consumers and 
employees, which can translate into higher firm value through better performance in product 
markets and labor markets. We further examine what determines the CEI score, and we find 
that firms that are younger, larger, have higher R&D expenses, and have higher leverage, 
tend to achieve higher CEI scores. Our results suggest that firms have a higher level of 
corporate equality possibly because of the need to attract talent, or to keep a good public 
image. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the growing 
literature on social responsibility by studying a special type of social responsibility–
corporate equality. 4 Second, we contribute to the SRI literature through the analysis of the 
effect of corporate equality on stock returns. We find evidence consistent with the value-
enchaning explanation that socially responsible corporate policies enhance firm value. Third, 
we provide suggestive, causal evidence from product markets and labor markets, to identify 
the mechanisms through which corporate equality affects firm value. Finally, we analyze the 
determinants of corporate equality, which is one of the few studies that empirically identify 
the determinants of socially responsible corporate policies. Our study also provides 
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of advocacy of corporate equality. Advocates of 
corporate equality, such as the HRC, have found that more and more people become aware 
of corporate equality issues and support more socially responsible, more equal companies. 
However, there is literally no empirical analysis on the effectiveness of the advocacy of 
corporate equality. 
 
The next section introduces the data sets. Section 3 presents our hypotheses, testing 
methodology, and empirical results, from the perspectives of capital markets, product 
markets, and labor markets. Section 4 tests what firm and industrial characteristics affect the 
CEI score, and section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Data 
 
Our data come from three sources. Our measure of corporate equality–corporate equality 
index (CEI) –is collected manually from the annual report Corporate Equality Index from 
2002 to 2006, available from the HRC web site (www.hrc.org). In 2002, the HRC, the 
largest national gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender (GLBT) civil rights organization in 
the U.S., began conducting an annual survey to rate large U.S. businesses on how they treat 
their GLBT employees, consumers, and investors, and initiated publication of an annual 
                                                 
4 Lev, Petrovits, and Radhakrishnan (2006) study how another specific type of social responsibility–corporate 
charitable contributions–affect revenue growth. 
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report on CEI. The CEI rates a company on a scale between 0 and 100 with 100 being the 
highest equality.5 Companies achieving a full score of 100 are selected as “the best places to 
work” in the annual “The State of Workplace,” a report that collects information on laws and 
policies concerning sexual orientation and gender identity in the workplace across the U.S., 
and aims to promote workplace diversity. Consumer-orientated businesses are included in 
the annual “Buying for Equality,” a guide advising consumers to buy products and services 
from companies with higher CEI scores. 
 
The 2002 sample that the HRC surveyed includes Fortune magazine’s 500 largest publicly 
traded companies in 2002, and 200 of the largest privately owned companies from the 2001 
Forbes magazine’s Private 500, and other companies that the HRC had sufficient 
information to rate. The sample expands over time to include the Fortune 1000, the Standard 
& Poor’s 500, Forbes’ list of the 200 largest privately held firms, and the American Lawyer 
100 in 2006. There are a total of 1,908 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2006. For our 
research purposes, we restrict our sample to the companies that are publicly traded and are 
included in both the CRSP and Compustat databases.  
 
We obtain monthly stock return data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
and financial statement variables from Compustat. In order to link the CEI data with the 
CRSP and Compustat data sets, we first match the CEI data with the Compustat data by 
company name, through a company-name-matching algorithm as described in Kerr and Fu 
(2008). This combined data set is further merged with the CRSP data through the CRSP and 
Compustat merged file obtained from Wharton Research Data Services. To ensure accuracy, 
we also check manually both matched and unmatched firms. The final data set contains 
1,283 firm-year observations in both CRSP and Compustat from 2002 to 2006. 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for our sample. Panel A presents descriptive statistics of 
CEI by year. In general, the CEI scores increase from 2002 to 2006. The average CEI score 
is 71.3 and the median is 75. Panel B presents summary statistics of the variables used in this 
paper. Following the prior literature, Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to 
the book value of assets (data6), where the market value is the book value of assets plus the 
market value of common stock (data25*data199) less the book value of common stock 
(data60+data74). Age is the number of years that a firm is available in CRSP. Log(Sales) is 
the natural logarithm of sales (data12). Log(Employee) is the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees in million (data29). Herfindahl index is the sum of squared sales-
based market shares of all firms in Compustat in a 2-digit SIC industry in a given year and 
its value lies between 0 and 1. Log(BM) is the logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity 
to the market value of equity. Net profit margin is income before extraordinary items (data18) 
divided by sales. Leverage is the ratio of total debt (data6–book value of equity) divided by 
the market value of total assets. S&P500 Firm is a dummy set to one if a firm is included in 
the S&P 500 index and zero otherwise. ROE is net income (data172) to the book value of 
                                                 
5 The rating indicators include whether a company includes “sexual orientation” and “gender identity” in its 
equal employment opportunity policy and whether a company provides diversity training on sexual orientation 
and gender identity, or the company has supportive gender transition guidelines, domestic partner health 
insurance, and at least one transgender wellness benefit. For details, see the survey questionnaire of each CEI 
report, available at  http://www.hrc.org/issues/ceihome.asp. 
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equity. Following Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Sin is a dummy set to one if a firm belongs 
to alcohol, tobacco or gambling industries.6 In our sample, there are only 33 firm-year 
observations for a total of eight unique firms in sin industries. Q, Size, Log(Sales), Log(BM), 
Herfindal index, Leverage, ROE, Log(employee), and Net profit margin are winsorized at the 
1% and 99% levels.   
 
We examine the effect of corporate equality on contemporaneous stock returns, as well as on 
future stock returns. Therefore, we use five different methods to form portfolios, in order to 
allow for different length of lags between CEI and stock returns. The baseline method is 
matching year t CEI with monthly stock returns from January of year t to December of year t. 
Since new CEI data are usually released in August or September of each year, we follow 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) to allow a one-month delay for investors to react to the 
new CEI information. Therefore, our second portfolio formation is matching year t CEI with 
monthly stock returns from October of year t to September of year t+1. The third portfolio 
formation is matching year t CEI with monthly stock returns from January of year t+1 to 
December of year t+1.  The fourth portfolio formation follows the asset pricing tests by 
Fama and French (1992, 1993). We match CEI in year t with monthly stock returns from 
July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. Lastly, we form portfolios for an extreme situation 
where investors use the first year CEI available to form portfolios, and then they do not react 
to updated CEI information in the following years. Although this situation is most unlikely, 
we still form portfolios accordingly for the sake of robustness. In this case, we match the 
first year CEI of each stock with the monthly returns in each year except the first year. Since 
the baseline portfolio formation examined CEI and contemporaneous stock returns, we skip 
the first-year stock returns, to avoid results driven by the same factor as captured by the 
baseline portfolio formation. This skipping procedure actually biases our results towards 
insignificance, if our results are driven by the contemporaneous correlation between CEI and 
stock returns.7  
 
Each year, we sort CEI scores into quartiles, and form monthly quartile portfolios using the 
five formation methods discussed above. Portfolios are rebalanced separately at each time 
point, according to the five formation methods. In Table 2, we report the average equally-
weighted monthly quartile portfolio returns for each formation method, with t-statistics 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors. In general, for all of the five formation 
methods, portfolio returns increase as CEI increases from the lowest quartile to the highest 
quartile. Moreover, the difference between returns of the highest quartile and the lowest 
quartile is significantly positive in all cases.  
  
3. Empirical tests 
 
3.1 Does corporate equality affect firm value? 
 
                                                 
6 Sin industries include SIC2100-2199, SIC 2080-2085, NAICS 7132, 71312, 713210, 71329,713290, 72112, 
and 721120. 
7For robustness checks, we re-do all tests without skipping the first year, and find that most results are much 
stronger (the results are not reported in this paper but are available upon request). 
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Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Renneboog, Horst and Zhang (2008) argue that investors 
valuing social responsibility are constrained in their investment sets, leading to lower returns. 
Socially responsible investors may also be willing to accept lower financial returns since 
they may derive non-financial utility from investing in assets consistent with their social 
norms. This value-discounting hypothesis predicts that firms with a higher CEI score have 
lower returns. In contrast, Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) point out that more 
democratic governance enhances firm value and leads to higher stock returns, suggesting 
that firms caring more about social responsibility will ultimately create more value for 
shareholders. This value-enhancing explanation predicts that firms with a higher CEI score 
have higher returns.  
 
To test these two competing hypotheses, we follow Hou and Robinson (2006) and Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2009), to perform a firm-level test using monthly returns. Following the 
standard procedure, accounting data in year t are matched with stock returns from July of 
year t+1 to June of year t+2. The model is specified as follows: 
 
           1 2 3 4
5 6
( ) ( )
       ,
it it it it it
it it it
R CEI Log Size Log BM Momentum
Beta Leverage
α β β β β
β β ε
= + + + +
+ + +                            (1) 
 
where i stands for firm and t for month. The dependent variable is the monthly stock returns 
in percentage points. Size is the market value of equity in June of year t+1. Momentum is the 
previous twelve months’ returns. Beta is the market model beta estimated using the prior 36 
monthly value-weighted CRSP index returns. Log(BM) and Leverage are as defined in Table 
1. Following Fama and MacBeth (1973), we run cross-sectional regressions every month and 
report the time-series average values of the monthly regression coefficients with time-series 
t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors. Results are summarized in Table 3.  
 
Consistent with the value-enhancing explanation, the coefficient of CEI is positive and 
statistically significant–at least at the 10% level–in all model specifications. After 
controlling for firm characteristics, an increase in CEI score by ten points is associated with 
a higher return of between 0.37 to 0.66 percentage points per year.  
 
Next, we follow Fama and French (1993), Carhart (1997), and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003)’s methodology to perform a portfolio test. As in Table 2, we sort CEI each year into 
quartiles, and calculate equally-weighted monthly returns for each quartile. We specify a 
four-factor model to test monthly portfolio returns for the 60 months period between January 
2002 and December 2006: 
 
         1 2 3 4( )t f t t t tR R RM RF SMB HML Momentum tα β β β β− = + − + + + + ε ,                   (2) 
 
where the dependent variable is the equally-weighted monthly portfolio returns, , minus 
the risk-free rate  in percentage points. RM- RF is the monthly market returns in excess 
of the risk-free rate. SMB, HML and Momentum are risk factors defined in Fama and French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997). Monthly stock returns of individual firms are obtained from 
CRSP. Monthly series of RM-RF, SMB, HML, and Momentum factors are obtained from 
tR
fR
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Wharton Research Data Services. For the purpose of robustness, we present regression 
results for all of the five portfolio formations in Table 4, where the t test statistics are 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors. 
 
After controlling for the four risk factors, the highest CEI quartile portfolio has significant 
positive abnormal returns (α), while the lowest CEI quartile portfolio has negative abnormal 
returns. The difference between the highest CEI quartile portfolio and the lowest quartile 
portfolio returns is significantly positive. Using the first formation method as an example, a 
trading strategy of buying the highest CEI quartile stocks and selling the lowest CEI quartile 
stocks yields an abnormal return of 4.8% annually. Overall, the results in Table 4 indicate 
that firms with a higher level of corporate equality have higher future stock returns.  
  
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that stocks in the sin industries have higher returns, lower 
Q, and lower price-earnings ratio. They argue that, applying the Gordon growth formula, 
1/(r-g), where r is the discount rate and g is the growth rate, the magnitude of excess return 
of sin stocks they find can basically match the magnitude of lower valuation of sin stocks. In 
our study, the value-enhancing hypothesis predicts that a company with a higher CEI score 
should have higher stock returns and better fundamentals (improved future cash flows), 
suggesting that a higher CEI score might be associated with a higher Q value. Following 
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Gompers Ishii, and Metrick (2003), we specify the 
following model to test whether firms with higher CEI scores have higher Q.  
 
           1 2 3 4
5 6 7
(  ) ( ) & 500
       ( & / ) ,
it t it it it it
it it it it
Q CEI Log Total Assets Log age S P
Delaware R D Sales ROE
α β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + +                   (3) 
 
where i stands for firm and t for year. The dependent variable is Q, defined as the ratio of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets. Explanatory variables are CEI plus the 
right-hand-side variables from Hong and Kacperczyk (2006) and Gompers Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003). Log(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets. Delaware 
is a dummy set to one if a firm is headquartered in Delaware and zero elsewhere. ROE is net 
income to the book value of equity. R&D/Sales is the R&D intensity in firm i, measured by 
R&D expenses divided by total sales, and is set to zero if R&D expenses are missing.8 Table 
5 summarizes the results. Model (1) is the Fama-MacBeth regression results with industry 
fixed-effects. We first estimate the cross-sectional regressions with industry dummies using 
Equation (3) annually from 2002 to 2006, then report the time-series average values of the 
annual regression coefficients with time-series t-statistics calculated using Newey-West 
standard errors. Model (2) and Model (3) are pooled regressions with industry and year fixed 
effects separately. Model (4) is pooled regression including both industry and year fixed 
effects. Model (5) is a panel data model with firm fixed effects. From Model (2) to Model 
(5), heterskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses under coefficients. In all 
models except Model (5), the coefficients of CEI are significantly positive, suggesting that 
the effect of CEI on Q is mostly a cross-sectional effect. Intuitively, firms with a higher CEI 
                                                 
8 R&D intensity is an important variable in estimating the effects of corporate social responsibility on financial 
performance. It can be partially controlled for by industry fixed effects. See McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and 
Waddock and Graves (1997). 
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score also have a relatively higher market valuation (Q) compared to their peers. This result 
is consistent with the value-enhancing theory that a higher degree of corporate equality 
improves the fundamentals of firms, and therefore leads to higher stock returns and higher 
market valuation.  
   
3.2 How does corporate equality affect firm value?  
 
The previous section has documented that firms with a higher level of equality have higher 
firm value. A natural question arises: How does corporate equality translate into firm value? 
We offer two plausible explanations. The first explanation is the product-market channel: 
Consumers caring about social responsibility follow the HRC’s or other media’s 
recommendations and purchase products and services from firms with a higher level of 
corporate equality, leading to more sales and higher profitability, and, consequently, higher 
firm value (Heal, 2005). This product-market explanation predicts that firms with higher CEI 
scores should have more sales and better operating performance. The second explanation is 
the labor-market channel: A higher level of equality will attract more talent and promote 
morale. Better employee relations and high-quality employees can enhance productivity and 
promote innovation (Heal, 2005), translating into better fundamentals and higher firm value. 
In addition, the labor supply curve for firms with higher CEI scores will shift outward if 
workers value corporate equality and have stronger incentive to work in more equal firms. 
This will lead to more hiring in more equal firms, ceteris paribus. Therefore, the labor-
market explanation predicts that firms with higher CEI scores have more advanced human 
capital, higher productivity, and more employees. To test the labor-market explanation, we 
would like to have detailed information on the quality of employees. However, given that 
our data contain no such information, we test only whether firms with higher CEI scores also 
have higher productivity (measured by total revenue per worker) and attract more employees. 
The section provides supportive empirical evidence for these two channels. 
 
3.2.1 Evidence from product markets 
 
The 1990 U.S. census, the first census containing sexual orientation information, reveals that 
gays and lesbians appear to receive higher education and higher earnings, compared to 
heterosexual counterparts (Black et al., 2000). It is not surprising to see that, during the past 
three decades, business interest has been gradually extended to a specific market segment–
the “gay market” (Baker, 1997). Although the exact number of GLBT population is 
unknown, the purchasing power of the gay market seems not negligible. The advocacy of 
corporate equality by the HRC would have had an impact on gay consumers; moreover, any 
consumers who value corporate equality, regardless of sexual orientation, would have 
supported firms with a higher level of equality, by purchasing products and services from 
them. 
 
The annual report Buying for Equality, published by the HRC, advocates consumers to make 
informed choices to support companies that are more equal.9 According the HRC statement, 
                                                 
9 For companies with a CEI score between 80 and 100, the guide rates them “the best places to shop” and 
advises that consumers “should make every effort to support these companies”; for companies with a CEI score 
below 45, the guide advises consumers to “avoid if possible”; and for companies with a CEI score between 46 
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during 2006, “more than 250,000 people used Buying for Equality to make informed choices 
about their purchases.” 10  Since many other advocates and human rights groups can also 
influence consumers who value social responsibility, presumably there have been enough 
consumers to influence product markets. We expect that firms with higher level of equality 
do better in product markets. Specifically, we expect that firms with higher CEI scores have 
higher sales and higher profit margins.  
 
We specify the following model to test whether firms with higher CEI scores have more 
sales: 
 
           1 2 3 4 4( ) ( ) ( ) ( )it t it it itLog Sales CEI Log age Log BM Log Size ,α β β β β= + + + + +ε          (4) 
 
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of sales. The independent variables are a set of 
standard controls, as in Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Hong and Kacperczyk  
(2009). Size is the market value of equity. We also include industry-fixed effects, year-fixed 
effects or firm-fixed effects as additional controls. 
 
Table 6 presents the estimated results. Similar to Table 5, Model (1) presents the Fama-
MacBeth regression results with industry fixed effects. Model (2), (3) and (4) are pooled 
OLS regressions with industry or year fixed effects, or both. Model (5) includes firm-fixed 
effects. As shown in Table 6, the coefficients of CEI are significantly positive in all models 
except in the model with only the year fixed effect, suggesting that it is important to control 
for industry differences when studying the effect of corporate equality on sales. After 
controlling for industry and year effects, a ten points increase in a firm’s CEI score is 
associated with, on average, about 2.7% higher sales per year (column 4).11 It is worth noting 
that, even after controlling for firm fixed effects in Model (5), the coefficient of CEI is still 
significantly positive, similar to the Model (4) result. This strongly suggests that the effect of 
CEI on sales is not driven by unobserved firm heterogeneities. 
 
Next, we examine whether firms with higher CEI scores have higher profit margins and 
specify the following model: 
 
                    1 2 3
4 5
  ( ) ( )
                                ( ) ,
t it
it it
Net profit margin CEI Log BM Log Size
Log age Leverage
α β β β
β β ε
= + + +
+ + +                        (5) 
 
where the dependent variable Net Profit Margin is calculated as income before extraordinary 
items divided by sales, in percentage points. Similar to Tables 4 and 5, in Table 7 we report 
Fama-MacBeth, year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and firm-fixed effects. Again, 
consistent with the product-market explanation, the coefficients of CEI are significantly 
                                                                                                                                                      
and 79, the HRC states that they “have taken steps toward a fair-minded workplace,” and consumers are 
suggested to support them whenever possible. 
10 Quotes are from Buying For Equality 2007, available at http://www.hrc.org/buyersguide/index.asp. 
11 We also use one-year sales growth as the dependent variable, but the coefficient is not significant in 
most cases. 
 
 10
positive except in the firm-fixed effect model. After controlling for industry and year fixed 
effects, an increase in CEI by ten points is associated with a 0.13 percentage point increase 
in net profit margin.  
 
3.2.2 Evidence from labor markets 
 
A few studies on the wage gap between homosexual and heterosexual people find that gay 
men earn less compared to heterosexual males (Badgett, 1995; Blandford, 2003), suggesting 
that possibly there exists labor market discrimination against gays. Another different strand 
of literature on regional and urban economics constructs a gay index, the proportion of gay 
population in a location, to measure the openness and tolerance of local social milieu. 
Florida (2005) shows that cities with a higher gay index tend to attract more talented people 
and more high-tech industries. Using both the 1990 and 2000 U.S. decennial census data, Fu 
(2007) finds that cities with a higher gay index have higher housing prices and higher 
housing price growth. These studies suggest that migration is closely tied to the social 
equality, diversity, and tolerance of workplace and residential places. We expect anyone who 
believes in corporate equality would prefer working in companies with higher CEI scores, 
ceteris paribus. This will shift outward the labor supply curve for those companies. In 
addition, employees in companies that value equality tend to have stronger morale and can 
lead to higher productivity. For a given wage rate, those companies will increase demand, 
shifting the demand curve outward. The final effect should be an increase in hiring.   
 
To test whether a higher level of corporate equality enhances workers’ productivity, we use 
total revenue per employee as a proxy for a worker’s productivity, and specify the following 
model: 
 
    
1 2 3
4 5 6
(   ) ( ) & 500
                                                   ( ) ( )
                                               
it t it it
it it it
Log Revenue per employee CEI Log Age S P
Log BM Tangibility Log Size
α β β β
β β β
= + + +
+ + +
7    ( & / ) .it itR D Salesβ ε+ +
       (6) 
 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total revenue divided by the number of 
employees. The right side variables are a set of standard controls. Tangibility is measured by 
the value of the plant, property and equipment (data8) divided by total assets. The estimate 
results are presented in Table 8. As expected, CEI is significantly positive in all model 
specifications except the model with only year fixed effects. When controlling both year and 
industry fixed effects, a ten points increase in CEI score is associated with a 1.8% increase in 
revenue per employee. This result is robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects. The 
coefficient of Tangibility is negative in all model specifications, possibly because tangible 
assets are used more extensively in traditional manufacturing firms than in firms of high-tech 
and services industries, resulting in a lower productivity.  
  
To test whether firms with higher CEI scores attract more employees, we estimate the 
following model: 
         1 2 3 4
5 6 7
( ) ( ) & 500 ( )
                               ( ) ( & / ) ,
it t it it it
it it it it
Log Employee CEI Log Age S P Log BM
Tangibility Log Size R D Sales
α β β β β
β β β
= + + + +
+ + + ε+           (7) 
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where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of total employees of firm i in 
year t. We include firm age to control for the possibility that firms with a longer history are 
likely to have more employees. The book-to-market ratio is used to control for the effect of 
investment opportunities on employment. Since the level and types of technologies may also 
affect employment, we use Tangibility to control for the effects of nature of assets on 
employment. We also include industry, year, or firm fixed effects in some models. 
 
Table 9 presents results for the impact of corporate equality on a firm’s total employment. 
Consistent with the labor-market explanation, when controlling for both industry and year 
fixed effects, the coefficient of CEI is significantly positive. An increase in the CEI score by 
ten points is associated with 1.9% higher total employment.  
 
In summary, we find that the effect of corporate equality on firm value comes from two 
channels: First, firms with a higher level of equality are favored by consumers and, therefore, 
perform better in terms of sales and profit margin. Second, firms providing a more equal 
environment can attract more motivated employees and enhance workers’ productivity, 
leading to a higher firm value.  
 
3.3. Endogeneity issue 
 
One concern about our study is that some unobserved firm characteristics could be correlated 
with the CEI variable, biasing the estimate of the coefficient of CEI. The typical argument 
would be that good management is positively correlated with CEI. For example, firms with 
good management may tend to implement more equal corporate policies, therefore, resulting 
in the spurious correlation between corporate equality and firm value. We deal with such an 
endogeneity issue in two ways.  
 
First, we estimate the previous models using a panel data approach, including firm fixed 
effects, whenever possible. This provides the most conservative estimates. Column 5 in 
Table 6 and Table 8 shows that, after controlling for firm fixed effects, CEI scores still have 
positive and significant effects on sales and productivity. Column 5 in Table 5 and Table 9 
shows that, after controlling for firm fixed effects, CEI scores have positive effects on Q and 
employment, although not significant. One exception is Column 5 in Table 7, where 
inclusion of firm fixed effects leads to negative effects of CEI scores on profit margins, but 
not significant. Cumulatively, all these firm fixed effects models lend some support to the 
argument that the endogeneity issue might exist, but is not a serious problem.12
 
Our second approach is to find a proxy for good management, and test whether the CEI is 
really positively correlated with the proxy. We use the rank of “Fortune 100 Best Companies 
to Work For in America” as a proxy for management quality. The data are constructed by the 
Great Place to Work Institute and are available at www.greatplacetowork.com.  The ranking 
is based on three dimensions: The relationship between employees and management, 
between employees and their jobs/company, and between employees and other 
                                                 
12 One possible reason that the firm fixed-effect results are not very strong is due to the fact that the time-series 
variation in the CEI score is not large enough: nearly 60% of yearly changes are zeros. 
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employees.13It is reasonable to assume that good management produces those three types of 
relationships, and, therefore, management quality should be positively correlated with the 
great-place-to-work ranking. Out of our sample of 1,283 firm years, 142 firm years have 
great-place-to-work rankings. We find that the rankings and the CEI index is negatively 
correlated (-0.178) and significant at the 5% level, which suggests that better management 
does not necessarily produce a higher CEI score. We also run the tests using great-place-to-
work rankings instead of CEI scores. In unreported tables, the coefficients of great-place-to-
work rankings are either insignificant or have the opposite signs. In general, we do not find 
that management quality can explain the effects of CEI, documented in the previous tables.  
Therefore, we tentatively conclude that endogeneity is not a serious problem to our previous 
estimates. 
 
4. What determines the CEI score? 
   
In the previous two sections, we have provided evidence that firms with a higher level of 
equality have higher value. Another natural question arises: What firm and industry 
characteristics determine a firm’s level of corporate equality? While it is hard to predict 
theoretically the association between a certain firm and industry characteristics and the CEI 
score, anecdotal evidence shows that harsh competition in an industry will motivate firms to 
increase their corporate equality practice. For example, Coca-Cola achieved a full score of 
100 in 2006 while RadioShack Corp. had a score of 40 in 2006.14We hypothesize that firms 
in more competitive industries tend to achieve higher CEI scores. We use the Herfindal 
index to measure industry competitiveness and specify the following model to test the 
competition hypothesis: 
 
           1 2 3 4
5 6 7
( & 500) ( ) ( ) ( )
            ( & / ) .
it t it it it it
t it
CEI S P Log Age Log Size Log BM
R D Sales Leverage Herfindal
α β β β β
β β β ε
= + + + +
+ + + + .           (8) 
 
The estimate results are shown in Table 10. The coefficients of the Herfindal index are 
insignificant. Instead, after controlling for industry, year, and state fixed effects, we find that 
firm size, R&D/sales, and leverage have significant positive effects on corporate equality. 
Intuitively, larger firms are more visible to the public and have a greater need to demonstrate 
that they are good employers. Firms with higher R&D expenses usually have a greater 
demand for more skillful employees, and therefore, have a greater need to achieve a higher 
level of corporate equality to attract talent. The positive effect of leverage on corporate 
equality can be explained in two ways. First, firms with a higher leverage usually have more 
interactions with external capital markets. As a result, firms with a higher leverage either are 
more equal or are required to show that they are more equal. Second, Jensen (1986) argues 
that higher leverage can put more pressure on managers and force managers to achieve better 
performance. Therefore, firms with a higher leverage will be more motivated to adopt 
equality policies to attract good employees. In unreported tables, we also add a sin dummy to 
indicate sin industries. The coefficients of the sin dummy are significantly positive in some 
                                                 
13 The quote is from http://www.greatplacetowork.com/great/index.php. 
14 The Herfindahl index for food & kindred products (SIC 20)  and home furniture &furnishing stores (SIC 57) 
in 2006 are 0.05 and 0.25, respectively. The mean value of the Herfindal index across industries in 2006 is 0.07.  
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specifications and are insignificant with year, industry, and state fixed effects. Adding the 
sin dummy does not affect coefficients of other variables. In general, the intuition from the 
results in Table 10 is that firms have a higher level of corporate equality because they are 
either in need of a good public image or in need of attracting talented employees. We also 
notice that firm age has a negative effect on corporate equality in most regressions, and a 
positive effect in firm-fixed effect models. This suggests that, cross-sectionally, older firms 
are more resistant to, while younger firms are more receptive to, equality policies. However, 
for a given firm, its level of corporate equality increases as time goes by (i.e., as the firm 
gets older). While these results are intuitive, the exact mechanisms cannot be revealed, given 
our data sets, and need further investigation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Many studies have shown that social norms affect firm performance, but the empirical 
results are inconclusive. Our study contributes to the literature by testing directly how and 
through what channels a specific type of social responsibility–corporate equality–affects 
capital market performance. We find that firms with a higher degree of corporate equality 
also have, on average, higher returns and market value. The association can be explained by 
the empirical evidence from product markets and labor markets: Firms with a high CEI score 
also tend to have larger sales, higher productivity in terms of revenue per employee, and 
attract more employees, probably because consumers and employees value corporate 
equality. We also apply a panel data, firm fixed effect approach to control for firm 
heterogeneities and the results generally confirm the previous findings. The overall results 
suggest that markets do value corporate equality. Our results are similar to those in Gompers, 
Ishii, and Metrick (2003), that firms with more democratic corporate governance (stronger 
shareholder rights) had higher firm value, higher profits, and higher sales growth. Our 
findings should be useful for people to make decisions on corporate-equality-related 
investment, marketing and advertising, and hiring issues. 
  
Our study can be extended in various directions. First, as institutional investors hold less sin 
stocks (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), they might hold more stocks of companies with high 
CEI scores or that are more socially responsible. Therefore, testing the institutional 
ownership of socially responsible stocks is of great interest. Second, the channels through 
which corporate equality enhances firm performance could be interpreted in more detail if 
more data are available. For example, does corporate equality help attract more skilled 
workers? Finally, the effect of corporate equality, and, in general, social responsibility, on 
capital market performance may also affect corporate financing behavior (Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009), which is also worth further investigation.  
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
 
This table summarizes statistics of 1,283 firm years with the Corporate Equality Index (CEI) 
which are listed in both Compustat and CRSP from 2002 to 2006. Q is the ratio of the 
market value of assets to the book value of assets. Age is the number of years available in 
CRSP. Log(Sales) is the logarithm of sales. Log(Employee) is the logarithm of the number 
of employees. Herfindahl index is the sum of squared sales-based market shares of all firms 
in Compustat in a 2-digit SIC industry in a given year, and its value lies between 0 and 1. 
Log(BM) is the logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. 
Net profit margin is income before extraordinary items divided by sales. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt divided by the sum of total debt and book value of equity. S&P 500 Firm 
is a dummy set to one if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index and zero elsewhere. ROE is 
earnings to the book value of equity.  
 
Panel A: descriptive statistics of CEI 
 N Mean Median Min Max Std 
2002 214 60.61 57.00 0.00 100.00 23.71 
2003 253 68.92 71.00 14.00 100.00 21.77 
2004 262 71.96 79.00 0.00 100.00 22.85 
2005 276 76.30 86.00 14.00 100.00 21.53 
2006 278 75.94 80.00 0.00 100.00 25.33 
Total 1,283 71.26 75.00 0.00 100.00 23.69 
 
 
Panel B: descriptive statistics of variables 
 Correlation 
with CEI 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
Q 0.029 1.863 1.476 0.866 6.117 1.045 
Log(Total assets) 0.300 9.821 9.692 6.159 14.050 1.686 
Age -0.105 34.122 31.000 1.000 81.000 24.331 
Log(Sales) 0.194 9.349 9.279 6.118 12.270 1.214 
Log(Employee) 0.102 3.531 3.630 0.182 6.035 1.229 
Herfindal -0.067 0.065 0.042 0.009 0.309 0.061 
Log(BM) -0.003 -0.976 -0.916 -3.447 0.634 0.717 
Net Profit Margin 0.165 0.077 0.069 -0.204 0.305 0.077 
Leverage 0.028 0.417 0.402 0.000 0.960 0.261 
S&P 500 0.125 0.775 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.418 
ROE -0.048 0.157 0.146 -1.077 1.718 0.281 
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Table 2 Cross-section of average stock returns 
 
This table presents average monthly returns, in percentage points, of quartile portfolios from 
January 2002 to December 2006. Each year, the CEI score of each firm is matched with 12 
months of stock returns using five methods with different lags between CEI year and future 
stock returns. 1) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from January to December of 
year t. 2) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from October of year t to September 
of year t+1, where October is the month following the release of new CEI scores; 3) 
Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from January to December of year t+1; 4) 
Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2; 5) 
Matching first-year CEI with monthly returns in consequent years, skipping the first-year 
returns. Each year, the CEI scores are sorted into quartiles. Equally-weighted, monthly, 
quartile portfolio returns are calculated each month. Average monthly quartile portfolio 
returns are presented in the table. T-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors 
are in parentheses.  
 
 Quartile (CEI rankings in year t)  
 1 Low 2 3 4 High 4-1 
Formation 1: CEI in year t matched with monthly returns from January to December of year 
t 
 0.9422 0.9249 1.1207 1.2362 0.2940 
 (3.047) (2.432) (4.770) (3.522) (2.519) 
      
Formation 2: CEI in year t matched with monthly returns from October of year t to 
September of year t+1 
 1.4241 1.6988 1.7073 2.0293 0.6052 
 (6.836) (4.718) (6.464) (4.823) (2.580) 
      
Formation 3: CEI in year t matched with monthly returns from January to December of year 
t+1 
 1.3211 1.6426 1.5933 1.8506 0.5295 
 (8.114) (4.933) (6.599) (5.925) (2.866) 
      
Formation 4: CEI in year t matched with monthly returns from July of year t+1 to June of 
year t+2 
 1.2468 1.4023 1.5420 1.5250 0.2782 
 (7.755) (6.429) (7.753) (6.496) (2.671) 
      
Formation 5: First year CEI matched with monthly returns in consequent years, skipping the 
first year returns 
 1.0969 1.4784 1.3908 1.4431 0.3462 
 (5.871) (4.277) (4.139) (4.895) (2.785) 
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Table 3 CEI index and stock return performance 2002 – 2006 
 
This table summarizes results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions explaining 
monthly stock returns from January of 2002 to December of 2006. The dependent variable is 
monthly stock returns in percentage points. Accounting data in year t are matched with 
monthly stock returns from July of year t+1 to June of year t+2. Size is the market value of 
equity in June of year t+1. BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity. Momentum is the previous twelve months’ returns. Beta is the market model beta 
estimated using the prior 36 monthly, value-weighted, CRSP index returns. Leverage is total 
debt divided by market value of total assets.  Each year, the CEI score of each firm is 
matched with 12 months of stock returns using five methods with different lags between CEI 
year and future stock returns. 1) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from January 
to December of year t. 2) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from October of year 
t to September of year t+1, where October is the month following the release of new CEI 
scores; 3) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from January to December of year 
t+1; 4) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from July of year t+1 to June of year 
t+2; 5) Matching first year CEI with monthly returns in consequent years, skipping the first-
year returns. Time-series average values of the monthly regression coefficients are reported 
with time-series t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors (in parentheses). 
Constants are not reported. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0050*** 0.0055** 0.0038* 0.0031* 0.0040*
 (3.547) (2.367) (1.745) (1.803) (1.826) 
Log(size) -0.1415** -0.1647* -0.1326 -0.1004 -0.1504*
 (-2.602) (-1.842) (-1.481) (-1.585) (-1.816) 
Log(BM) 0.2526*** 0.3205*** 0.3655*** 0.3888*** 0.3446***
 (4.020) (4.060) (4.879) (3.695) (2.907) 
Momentum -0.7641** -1.0501 -0.6607 -0.0919 -0.4733 
 (-2.027) (-1.457) (-1.230) (-0.316) (-0.624) 
Beta 0.0641 0.4544 0.2586 0.1094 0.2705 
 (0.380) (1.490) (1.213) (0.833) (0.908) 
Leverage 0.2485 0.0652 0.0349 -0.0147 0.0437 
 (1.336) (0.239) (0.122) (-0.0383) (0.100) 
Number of months 60 51 48 42 48 
Total observations 15387 12753 11812 10040 11884 
Adj R2 0.095 0.093 0.079 0.074 0.079 
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Table 4 Performance of quartile portfolios 
 
This table summarizes regression results of portfolios sorted by CEI from January of 2002 to 
December of 2006. The dependent variable is the equally-weighted, monthly, quartile 
portfolio returns minus the risk-free rate in percentage points. Each year, the CEI score of 
each firm is matched with 12 months of stock returns using five methods with different lags 
between CEI year and future stock returns. 1) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns 
from January to December of year t. 2) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from 
October of year t to September of year t+1, where October is the month following the release 
of new CEI scores ; 3) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from January to 
December of year t+1; 4) Matching CEI in year t with monthly returns from July of year t+1 
to June of year t+2; 5) Matching first year CEI with monthly returns in consequent years, 
skipping the first-year returns. Each year, CEI scores are sorted into quartiles, and equally-
weighted quartile portfolio returns are calculated. RM- RF, SMB, HML and Momentum are 
risk factors defined by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). T-statistics calculated 
using Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 Quartile (CEI rankings in year t)  
 Low 1 2 3 4 High 4-1 
Formation 1: CEI in year t matched with monthly excess returns from January of year t to 
December of year t 
α -0.042 -0.063 0.188 0.356 0.397 
 (-0.89) (-0.88) (2.40) (2.55) (3.20) 
RM-RF 102.135 97.882 89.564 107.552 5.417 
 (28.3) (40.0) (43.6) (51.7) (1.58) 
SMB 24.407 26.383 31.843 11.085 -13.322 
 (3.80) (2.19) (2.06) (2.42) (-4.21) 
HML 14.815 30.531 14.808 25.660 10.846 
 (3.91) (15.2) (5.80) (7.37) (2.95) 
Momentum -2.673 -23.622 -15.155 -30.780 -28.107 
 (-0.89) (-10.0) (-6.30) (-11.2) (-6.48) 
Formation 2: CEI in year t matched with monthly excess returns from October of year t to 
September of year t+1 
α -0.192 -0.084 0.071 0.253 0.445 
 (-1.99) (-0.77) (0.47) (4.49) (3.86) 
RM-RF 101.390 90.005 98.176 112.453 11.063 
 (21.9) (23.7) (22.1) (44.5) (2.39) 
SMB 15.520 26.936 16.619 2.962 -12.558 
 (4.41) (2.34) (1.33) (0.76) (-2.52) 
HML 13.542 39.959 13.659 17.939 4.396 
 (3.95) (5.99) (1.64) (3.75) (1.40) 
Momentum -2.581 -30.167 -15.142 -19.596 -17.015 
 (-0.75) (-10.2) (-5.85) (-3.94) (-2.64) 
Formation 3: CEI in year t matched with monthly excess returns in from January of year 
t+1 to December of year t+1 
α -0.195 0.064 0.177 0.222 0.417 
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 (-1.69) (0.67) (1.43) (2.37) (5.49) 
RM-RF 99.553 109.308 107.841 114.575 15.022 
 (23.0) (12.5) (25.9) (52.2) (3.66) 
SMB 13.645 -2.296 -4.338 4.350 -9.296 
 (3.59) (-0.60) (-0.68) (0.37) (-0.72) 
HML 12.617 17.848 -3.031 12.371 -0.247 
 (3.17) (5.23) (-0.50) (1.98) (-0.043) 
Momentum -4.641 -19.905 -8.735 -6.580 -1.939 
 (-1.12) (-6.77) (-2.26) (-2.03) (-0.40) 
Formation 4: CEI in year t matched with monthly excess returns from July of year t+1 to 
June of year t+2 
α -0.114 0.220 0.274 0.200 0.314 
 (-2.00) (3.45) (2.04) (2.05) (2.58) 
RM-RF 101.599 94.841 95.606 121.782 20.183 
 (29.2) (15.2) (38.1) (55.8) (4.32) 
SMB 7.443 -5.940 5.852 -13.380 -20.823 
 (1.30) (-1.40) (0.56) (-1.16) (-1.33) 
HML 19.541 20.459 18.808 -5.899 -25.440 
 (4.58) (6.36) (1.43) (-0.85) (-5.22) 
Momentum -11.009 -10.971 -20.932 8.342 19.351 
 (-2.38) (-2.06) (-4.10) (1.64) (5.36) 
Formation 5: First-year CEI matched with monthly excess returns in consequent years, 
skipping the first-year returns 
α -0.139 0.100 0.095 0.078 0.217 
 (-0.80) (1.01) (1.60) (0.69) (2.38) 
RM-RF 98.293 114.141 100.138 111.924 13.631 
 (16.5) (18.2) (15.9) (51.9) (2.32) 
SMB 2.649 -0.885 3.260 4.789 2.140 
 (0.62) (-0.19) (0.66) (0.55) (0.28) 
HML 14.560 7.324 19.070 4.335 -10.225 
 (2.97) (1.00) (2.29) (0.69) (-1.05) 
Momentum -6.668 -17.429 -12.228 -12.218 -5.549 
 (-1.31) (-7.39) (-1.86) (-5.19) (-0.85) 
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Table 5 Firm value and CEI index 
 
This table summarizes the results of regressions for a sample of 1,283 firm years from 2002 
to 2006. The dependent variable is Q, defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets. CEI is the Corporate Equality Index. Log(Total assets) is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets. Log(Age) is the logarithm of firm age, measured 
by the number of years available in CRSP. S&P 500 Firm is a dummy set to one if a firm is 
included in the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Delaware Firm is a dummy set to one if 
a firm is headquartered in Delaware and zero otherwise. ROE is net income to the book 
value of equity. R&D/Sales is R&D over sales where missing R&D data are set to zero. For 
Fama-MacBeth regressions, industry-fixed effects are included and time-series average 
values of the annual regression coefficients are reported with time-series t-statistics 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For other regressions, t-
statistics calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in 
parentheses. Constants are not reported. Industries are 48 industries classified by Fama-
French (1997). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Q 
 (1) FM (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0028*** 0.0028*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0011 
 (6.428) (3.162) (2.854) (2.774) (1.347) 
Log(Total assets) -0.1009*** -0.1031*** -0.1797*** -0.1029*** -0.3514***
 (-5.166) (-6.671) (-14.44) (-6.658) (-3.191) 
Log(Age) -0.1210*** -0.1125*** -0.0810** -0.1151*** 0.4381***
 (-7.266) (-3.283) (-2.383) (-3.332) (4.265) 
S&P 500 0.2388*** 0.2262*** 0.2252*** 0.2329*** - 
 (7.209) (3.411) (3.460) (3.499)  
Delaware Firm 0.1891** 0.0578 -0.1925 0.0659 - 
 (3.599) (0.399) (-0.973) (0.465)  
R&D/Sales 8.7508*** 8.4575*** 8.1062*** 8.4889*** -4.2733**
 (15.71) (8.489) (13.02) (8.504) (-1.987) 
ROE 1.5283*** 1.3930*** 1.5657*** 1.3824*** 0.4703***
 (23.73) (11.36) (12.54) (11.19) (5.471) 
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.482 0.525 0.447 0.524 0.897 
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Table 6 Product market evidence - Sales and CEI index 
 
This table summarizes the results of regressions of sales on the CEI and control variables, 
for a sample of 1,283 firm years from 2002 to 2006. The dependent variable is the natural 
logarithm of sales.  Log(BM) is the natural logarithm of the book value of equity divided by 
the market value of equity. Log(Age) is the  natural logarithm of firm age, measured by the 
number of years available in CRSP. Log(Size) is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, calculated as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of 
year t. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, industry-fixed effects are included and time-series 
average values of the annual regression coefficients are reported with time-series t-statistics 
calculated using Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For other regressions, t-
statistics calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in 
parentheses. Constants are not reported. Industries are 48 industries classified by Fama-
French (1997). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
 Log(Sales) 
 (1)FM (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0019*** 0.0023*** -0.0004 0.0027*** 0.0026***
 (7.389) (2.768) (-0.401) (3.266) (4.833) 
Log(Age) 0.0254 0.0215 0.0807** 0.0221 0.4918***
 (0.982) (0.833) (2.570) (0.856) (5.912) 
Log(BM) 0.4257*** 0.4444*** 0.4994*** 0.4381*** 0.1086***
 (25.82) (14.02) (16.70) (13.78) (3.114) 
Log(Size) 0.7455*** 0.7198*** 0.6834*** 0.7208*** 0.1689***
 (39.86) (32.43) (17.01) (32.20) (2.595) 
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.792 0.795 0.665 0.796 0.985 
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Table 7 Product market evidence- Profit margin and CEI index 
 
This table summarizes the results of regressions of profit margin on the CEI and control 
variables for a sample of 1,283 firm years from 2002 to 2006. The dependent variable is net 
profit margin, in percentage points, and earnings to total assets (ROA), in percentage points. 
Log(BM) is the natural logarithm of book value of equity divided by market value of equity. 
Log(Age) is the log of firm age, measured by the number of years available in CRSP. 
Log(Size) is the log of market capitalization, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity at the end of year t. Leverage is the total debt divided by the market 
value of total assets. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, industry-fixed effects are included and 
time-series average values of the annual regression coefficients are reported with time-series 
t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For other 
regressions, t-statistics calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are 
reported in parentheses. Constants are not reported. Industries are 48 industries classified by 
Fama-French (1997). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Net Profit Margin 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0124*** 0.0190*** 0.0152* 0.0130* -0.0051 
 (7.222) (2.814) (1.900) (1.887) (-0.397) 
Log(BM) -1.4850** -1.5150*** -2.5790*** -1.5032*** 0.4062 
 (-4.263) (-5.146) (-8.158) (-5.151) (0.492) 
Log(Size) 1.5754*** 1.5087*** 2.0775*** 1.5022*** 0.1511 
 (31.04) (9.455) (10.19) (9.455) (0.239) 
Log(Age) 0.5674 0.8005*** 0.0447 0.7685*** 7.1831***
 (2.093) (3.249) (0.181) (3.162) (4.127) 
Leverage -10.3703*** -11.2197*** 0.6773 -10.7625*** -26.3428***
 (-14.32) (-9.769) (0.712) (-9.228) (-5.447) 
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.482 0.479 0.288 0.483 0.728 
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Table 8 Labor market evidence - Employee productivity and CEI index 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of revenue per employee on the CEI, for a 
sample of 1,283 firm years from 2002 to 2006. The dependent variable is the logarithm of 
revenue divided by the number of employees. Log(Age) is the logarithm of number of years 
available in CRSP. S&P 500 is a dummy set to one if a firm is included in the S&P 500 
index, and zero otherwise. Log(BM) is the logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity to 
the market value of equity. Herfindahl index is the sum of squared sales-based market shares 
of all firms in a 2-digit SIC industry in a given year, and its value lies between 0 and 1. 
Tangibility is the tangibility of the firm’s assets, measured as the value of plant, property and 
equipment divided by total assets. Log(Size) is the log of market capitalization, calculated as 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of year t. Leverage is the total 
debt divided by the market value of total assets. R&D/Sales is R&D over sales where 
missing R&D data are set to zero. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, industry-fixed effects are 
included and time-series average values of the annual regression coefficients are reported 
with time-series t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For 
other regressions, t-statistics calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity 
are reported in parentheses. Constants are not reported. Industries are 48 industries classified 
by Fama-French (1997). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Log(Revenue/Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0019*** 0.0024*** 0.0005 0.0018** 0.0019***
 (14.53) (3.505) (0.476) (2.548) (4.218) 
Log(Age) -0.0523** -0.0439 0.0624** -0.0527* 0.2897***
 (-3.662) (-1.555) (2.014) (-1.853) (4.540) 
S&P 500 -0.0645* -0.0857 -0.0458 -0.0605 - 
 (-2.468) (-1.605) (-0.667) (-1.128)  
Log(BM) 0.0878*** 0.0810*** 0.3867*** 0.0908*** -0.0533*
 (17.59) (2.942) (11.36) (3.260) (-1.774) 
Tangibility -0.6060*** -0.6048*** -0.9924*** -0.5868*** -1.1156***
 (-4.636) (-4.659) (-7.485) (-4.506) (-4.490) 
Log(Size) 0.0888*** 0.0900*** 0.1743*** 0.0849*** 0.0503 
 (8.248) (7.123) (10.07) (6.700) (1.607) 
R&D/Sales 0.6333** 0.5038 0.5359* 0.5588 -2.8971***
 (3.837) (0.991) (1.921) (1.100) (-4.310) 
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.599 0.638 0.220 0.642 0.971 
 
 26
Table 9 Labor markets evidence – Employment and CEI index 
 
This table presents the results of regressions of employment on the CEI for a sample of 
1,283 firm years from 2002 to 2006. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number 
of employees. Log(Age) is the logarithm of number of years available in CRSP. S&P 500 is 
a dummy set to one if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Log(BM) 
is the logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. Herfindahl 
index is the sum of squared sales-based market shares of all firms in a 2-digit SIC industry in 
a given year, and its value lies between 0 and 1. Tangibility is the tangibility of the firm’s 
assets, measured as the value of plant, property and equipment divided by total assets. 
Log(Size) is the logarithm of market capitalization, calculated as the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity at the end of year t. R&D/Sales is R&D over sales, where missing 
R&D data are set to zero. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, industry-fixed effects are included 
and time-series average values of the annual regression coefficients are reported with time-
series t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. For other 
regressions, t-statistics calculated using standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity are 
reported in parentheses. Constants are not reported. Industries are 48 industries classified by 
Fama-French (1997). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 Log(Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
CEI 0.0012** 0.0007 0.0006 0.0019** 0.0007 
 (4.553) (0.829) (0.440) (2.114) (1.577) 
Log(Age) 0.0420 0.0228 0.0120 0.0360 0.1902***
 (1.698) (0.681) (0.269) (1.087) (3.190) 
S&P 500 0.0107 0.0738 -0.0825 0.0318  
 (0.332) (1.168) (-1.055) (0.501)  
Log(BM) 0.3091*** 0.3409*** 0.0306 0.3223*** 0.1639***
 (9.134) (10.30) (0.763) (9.714) (4.400) 
Tangibility 0.9491*** 0.8627*** 1.2720*** 0.8324*** 0.8080***
 (11.14) (4.782) (8.498) (4.650) (2.998) 
Log(Size) 0.6825*** 0.6460*** 0.5387*** 0.6541*** 0.1122***
 (38.07) (26.44) (12.55) (26.23) (2.693) 
R&D/Sales -7.0379*** -6.6445*** -4.3690*** -6.8034*** 0.2335 
 (-41.51) (-10.60) (-9.811) (-11.02) (0.406) 
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.716 0.725 0.412 0.731 0.986 
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Table 10 CEI index and firm characteristics 
 
This table summarizes the results of regressions of the CEI index on firm characteristics, for 
a sample of 1,283 firm years from 2002 to 2006. The dependent variable is the CEI index. 
Log(Age) is the logarithm of the number of years available in CRSP. S&P 500 is a dummy 
set to one if a firm is included in the S&P 500 index, and zero otherwise. Log(BM) is the 
logarithm of the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity. Herfindahl index 
is the sum of squared sales-based market shares of all firms in a 2-digit SIC industry in a 
given year, and its value lies between 0 and 1. Log(Size) is the logarithm of market 
capitalization, calculated as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of 
year t. R&D/Sales is R&D over sales, where missing R&D data are set to zero. Leverage is 
the total debt divided by the market value of total assets. For Fama-MacBeth regressions, 
industry-fixed effects are included and time-series average values of the annual regression 
coefficients are reported with time-series t-statistics calculated using Newey-West standard 
errors in parentheses. For other regressions, t-statistics calculated using standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity are reported in parentheses. Constants are not reported. 
Industries are 48 industries classified by Fama-French (1997). ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
 CEI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
S&P 500 2.383 1.780 6.095*** 2.847 1.133 - 
 (0.824) (0.916) (3.594) (1.494) (0.574)  
Log(Age) -2.440** -1.817* -3.634*** -2.815*** -1.044 31.179***
 (-2.657) (-1.820) (-4.420) (-3.097) (-1.059) (6.446) 
Log(Size) 4.462*** 4.568*** 3.169*** 3.895*** 3.361*** 0.552 
 (25.88) (7.919) (5.976) (6.984) (5.929) (0.185) 
Log(BM) 1.022 0.293 -0.471 -0.603 0.001 2.300 
 (1.226) (0.246) (-0.466) (-0.596) (0.001) (1.223) 
R&D/Sales 61.479*** 60.933*** 80.971*** 54.065*** 71.485*** 44.673 
 (8.134) (3.215) (6.895) (4.076) (3.699) (0.968) 
Leverage 27.148*** 23.472*** 21.931*** 17.247*** 21.627*** -25.425**
 (16.60) (5.337) (7.222) (5.540) (4.889) (-2.032) 
Herfindal - - 3.892 3.415 - - 
   (0.627) (0.510)   
Fama-MacBeth Yes - - - - - 
Industry-fixed effects Yes Yes - - Yes - 
Year-fixed effects - - Yes - Yes - 
State-fixed effects    Yes Yes - 
Firm-fixed effects - - - - - Yes 
N 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 1283 
Adj R2 0.174 0.209 0.170 0.202 0.358 0.735 
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